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1Abstract
The starting point of this paper is that a group of countries cooperate to reduce global
emissions of CO2. In order to reduce the cost of achieving a target for global emissions
reduction, they offer a non-cooperating country a financial transfer for implementing
abatement policies. The non-cooperating country has access to private information both
before and after the contract is signed. We analyze the design of an abatement contract,
and evaluate under what circumstances and at what time it is valuable for the cooperating
countries to acquire more information about the non-cooperating country's abatement
cost, although this is costly.
Key words: climate policy, incentive contracts, asymmetric information, joint         
implementation
21. Introduction
Emissions of greenhouse gases is a global problem that demands international agreement
to be solved. By ratifying the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(FCCC) more than 140 countries have expressed their willingness to take some kind of
action. However, as of yet the FCCC does not include any legally binding commitments
for emissions reduction.
It is the total amount of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere and not the geographical
location of emissions that determines global warming. A cost-effective policy to mitigate
emissions implies that marginal abatement cost should be equalized across all countries.
However, it seems unlikely that all countries will participate in an international climate
agreement due to free rider incentives. If many countries cooperate to reduce emissions,
any individual country could be better off if the other countries cooperate, while the
country does not take part in the agreement and pursues its own interest. In spite of free
rider incentives we will in this paper assume that a group of countries have a self interest
in avoiding deviation. (See Hoel (1994) and Barrett (1994) for a discussion of the
existence of a stable coalition in spite of free rider incentives). These countries, referred
to as the cooperating countries, are assumed to set a target for global CO2-abatement in
a future year. They introduce harmonized domestic CO2 taxes or tradable emission
permits to ensure cost-effectiveness within the cooperating countries. However, the cost
of reaching the global target could be reduced if the cooperating countries could,
through side payments, induce non-cooperating countries with lower abatement costs to
reduce their emissions.
Several studies have pointed out the differences in CO2-abatement costs across countries,
and hence the scope for cost savings by a cost-effective distribution of abatement. See
UNEP (1994) for a comparison of abatement costs in some developing countries and
Kram (1993) for a comparison of abatement costs in selected OECD countries. Burniaux
3et al. (1992) have analyzed the cost saving potential of a cost-effective distribution of
abatement. They consider a stabilization scenario in which the OECD countries stabilize
their emissions by 2010 at 80 per cent of their 1990 levels and non-OECD countries
stabilize their emissions at a level 50 per cent higher than their 1990 levels. They find that
the global abatement cost of this stabilization scenario could be cut in half by
cost-effective abatement.
The FCCC states that developed country Parties and countries that are undergoing the
process of transition to market economy “may implement policies and measures jointly
with other Parties in contributing to the achievement of the objective of the Convention”
(article 4.2 (a)). This option is usually referred to as Joint Implementation (JI) or
Activities Implemented Jointly (AIJ). JI is one way of reducing the global cost of
achieving a cut in global emissions of greenhouse gases through international
cooperation. The idea of JI is to reduce the total cost of a given reduction in the
emissions of greenhouse gases by separating the commitm nt of each country Party from
the implementation of measures. For a discussion of the merits and demerits of JI see
Hanisch (1991), Barrett (1993a) and (1993b), Jones (1993), Bohm (1994), Mintzer
(1994) and Hagem (1996). The term JI is usually used on investment in specific
abatement projects. The investor finances specific JI projects and receives abatement
credits for the abatement achieved through the projects. In this paper we will consider a
regime where a non-cooperating country can choose which projects to implement in
order to achieve a certain reduction in national emissions. The cooperating countries pay
the non-cooperating country for the abatement when the reduction in emissions is
observed.
Hoel (1994) discusses the option of inducing non-cooperating countries to implement
national climate policies that affect the consumption and/or production of fossil fuels in
these countries. This is achieved through financial transfers that make each country
equally well off with the transfer and the climate policy as it would be without the
transfer and the policy. In Hoel (1994) it is assumed that the cooperating countries have
4complete information about the non-cooperating countries’ cost of the climate policy. In
this paper we analyze the cooperating countries' policy toward a non-cooperating
country in a situation where relevant information about the non-cooperating country’s
abatement cost is costly to obtain for the cooperating countries. The ptimal design of a
contract offered to a non-cooperating country under asymmetric information is analyzed.
Furthermore, the value of additional but costly information for the cooperating countries
is discussed. These questions will be analyzed within a principal-agent framework. The
principal acts on behalf of the cooperating countries and the agent acts on behalf of the
non-cooperating country. The principal acts as a Stackelberg leader that offers an
abatement contract to the agent. For a survey of literature on regulation under
asymmetric information see Caillaud et al. (1988) or Baron (1989).
We will assume that the agent gets access to private information at two different dates.
The agent has private information at the time of entering into the contract. Furthermore,
since the contract specifies an abatement level to be achieved some years ahead, we
assume there are several factors that have an influence on the cost that is not available
information at the time of entering into a contract, for neither the agent nor the principal.
We will assume that the agent learns more about the non-cooperating country's
abatement cost when different abatement projects have been implemented.
An example of this kind of contract could be a non-cooperating country that reduces the
emission of CO2 by substituting some of the national consumption of coal by gas for heat
supply.1 A conversion from coal to gas fired heat plants (boilers) would decrease the
emissions of CO2 per unit use of energy since the carbon content of gas is about 57 per
cent of the carbon content of coal per energy unit. The cost of this investment will inter
alia depend on the expected lifetime of the coal based boilers in use. If the existing
technology is old and has to be replaced by new investment anyway, the cost of
                                         
1 A coal-to-gas conversion pilot project, partly financed through a grant from The Global Environmental Facility
(GEF) and the Government of Norway, is about to be implemented in Poland. (GEF is managed by the World Bank,
the UNDP and UNEP). The grant partly covers the cost of  a replacement of coal fired boilers with condensing gas
fired boilers for heat supply and a replacement of coal fired boilers with a  cog neration unit based on gas supplying
heat and electricity. See Selrod and Sørensen (1994) for a description of the project.
5replacement would be less than if the existing technology had a long expected lifetime.
Information about the condition of the existing technology is likely to be private
information to the authorities in the non-cooperating country when the contract is
signed. The exact cost of a conversion from coal-to-gas project depends on the impact
on the demand for energy. The impact on the demand for energy depends on the price
difference between coal and gas and the price elasticity. The exact impact on the demand
for energy and hence the impact on emissions is not known to any of the parties at the
time of signing the contract. The agent can, however, observe the impact on the energy
demand of each of the projects and hence learn more about the cost of achieving a
certain abatement target. Even though this information is not observed by the principal,
we will show that it is optimal for the principal to allow for some flexibility in the
contract. That is, the contract should specify different options for abatement levels,
where the agent can choose the abatement level when the relevant information about the
abatement cost is observed.
Cost-effective distribution of abatement implies that the marginal abatement cost should
be equal in the cooperating and non-cooperating country. The principal’s benefit of
abatement carried out in the non-cooperating country is equal to the corresponding
reduction in the cooperating countries’ abatement cost. A cost-effective distribution of
abatement in the case of asymmetric information can be achieved by giving the agent a
monetary reward as a function of abatement, where the reward function is identical to
the principal’s benefit function of abatement carried out by the non-cooperating country.
The agent would then choose an abatement level that implied that the marginal
abatement cost in the non-cooperating country would equalize the principal's marginal
benefit of abatement. This result was noted by Loeb and Magat (1979) for the case
where the agent produced a quantity of a pure public good. Caillaud et. al (1988) point
out that this mechanism corresponds to a Groves scheme. It was discovered by Groves
(1973) and Clarke (1971) that any efficient provision of public goods can be
implemented as long as budget balance is not required. In the problem discussed in this
paper, financial transfer from the principal to the agent represents a loss to the principal.
It is shown in the literature on asymmetric information that when there is a cost of
6transferring money, the efficient output is not necessarily the preferred output by the
principal. The optimal solution trades off financial losses against efficiency losses.
Baron and Myerson (1982) show the derivation of an optimal regulation of a monopolist
with unknown marginal cost when there is a cost of transferring money to the firm. In
this paper we will use a “two-types of agents” version of that model. The model is
expanded with a cost parameter that is unknown at the time of signing the contract but
observable for the agent at a later time. The agent will hence have access to private
information both before and after the contract is signed. We assume that the there is no
correlation between the information received at the different dates.2 We show hat the
optimal contract offered to the agent specifies financial transfers and abatement levels
depending of the agent's announcement of its private information at the different dates
when the information is acquired. Sequential communication of private information is
studied in a paper by Christensen and Feltham (1994). They study a contract situation
where a principal hires an agent to perform a task. The outcome is a function of the
agent’s effort, which is unobservable to the principal, and a random state of nature. The
agent is risk averse and effort averse. The agent has no private information when the
contract is signed, but receives two private signals, at different dates, before he
implements his effort choice to perform the task. They show that the principal weakly
prefers that the agent reports each signal at the date it is observed, compared to a
simultaneous report of both signals when the second signal is observed. In this paper we
assume that the agent is risk neutral. If the agent is risk neutral and has no private
information at the time when the contract is signed, private information after the contract
is signed represents no cost for the principal if the agent can commit to not quit the
                                         
2 Laffont and Tirole (1993, ch.1.8) study a contractible investment model with a similar timing of private
information as in this paper. In their model, the agent has private information about an efficiency parameter of its
investment before entering into a contract. The agent privately observes the realization of an operating cost
parameter after the contract is signed and privately observes its own effort to perform the task specified in the
contract. The principal and the agent contract on investment and the cost of performing the task. They show how the
investment level must be corrected to contribute to rent extraction when there is a corr lation between the
efficiency parameter of investment and the operating cost parameter.
7relationship.3 However, we will show that if the agent has some private information
before entering into the contract, additional private information at a later date will be
costly for the principal even if the agent is risk neutral. The principal's cost of the
contract will be reduced if the agent announces its private information at the different
points of time when the information is observed compared a simultaneous announcement
after both types of information have been observed.
Since the climate contract considered in this paper is a contract between countries, we
assume that it is not possible for the principal to enforce the agent to fulfill the contract if
the agent finds it more beneficial to breach the contract. The only instrument for inducing
the agent to fulfill the target is the monetary transfer specified in the contract. A situation
where the agent can find it beneficial to breach the contract in the case of bad realizations
of the cost parameter corresponds to a situation in which the agent is unable to fulfill the
contract for bad realizations of the cost parameter due to limited liability. Sappington
(1983) shows that a limited liability constraint induces the principal to design a contract
that distorts output from the first-best level even though the firm had no private
information at the time the contract was signed.
We assume that the principal will never breach the contract or demand to renegotiate the
contract. The justification for this assumption is that the principal might want to keep a
good reputation in case it will offer abatement contracts to other countries (or the same
country) in the future.
Before designing the contract, the principal decides how much costly information she
should try to obtain. The principal has two options for what time she could acquire
information. Information about the non-cooperating country’s expected abatement cost
                                         
3 If the agent is risk neutral, can commit not to quit the relationship and all information is symmetric when the
contract is signed, the principal designs a contract which induces the agent to report its private information obtained
after the contract is signed truthfully and leaves the agent with zero expected rent. The case of a risk neutral agent,
symmetric information before the contract is signed and private information after has, among others, been discussed
in Rey and Tirole (1986) and Baron (1989).
8can be obtained before the contract is offered. Furthermore, the principal can design a
contract that will give her access to the same information as the agent obtains during the
contract period. This could, for instance, be achieved if the principal monitored or took
some direct part in the implementation of abatement projects. Both options for acquiring
more information are assumed to be costly for the principal.
In the next section we present the model and the optimal design of a contract in the
absence of asymmetric information. In the third and fourth section we derive the design
of abatement contracts when the agent has access to private information. Furthermore,
we analyze the value for the principal of acquiring more information about the cost
function before the contract is offered to the agent, and the value of designing a contract
where the principal observes the same information as the agent after the contract is
signed. Concluding remarks are given in the last section.
2. The model
2.1. Preferences and technology
The principal acts on behalf of the cooperating countries and seeks to minimize the
expect total cost of achieving a certain target for global abatement within a future year.
It is assumed that the principal has complete information about the cooperating countries'
abatement costs. However, she has incomplete information about the non-cooperating
country’s expected abatement cost at the time of entering into the contract. Furthermore,
the principal knows that the non-cooperating country’s abatement cost is a function of a
stochastic variable, where the realized value is unknown when the contract is signed, but
will be observed by the agent in a future year previous to the target year. The principal is
risk neutral. The cost of reaching the abatement target is the sum of the abatement costs
within the cooperating countries and the financial transfer the principal has to give to the
agent, in order to induce the country to abate, plus the possible costs of acquiring
information. ATC is the principal’s abatement cost of achieving the abatement target less
9of the cost of acquiring information.
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ATC is given by
ATC R r D R r S D D( , ) ( ) ( ) , ( )/ //= - + × > × > 0 0 (1)
R is the global abatement target, r is the abatement carried out by the agent, D()× , is t
cooperating countries' abatement cost function, and S is the financial transfer to the
agent.
The agent acts on behalf of the non-cooperating country. The agent is risk neutral and
profit maximizing. The agent’s profit (P) of the abatement contract is given by
P( , , ) ( , , )r S C rb q b q= - (2)
where C()× is the non-cooperating country’s abatement cost function.
q and b are independent parameters. We have the following assumptions about the cost
function;
C C C C C and Cr rr r r
/ // / / // //( ) , ( ) , ( ) , ( ) , ( ) ( )× > × > × > × > × > × >0 0 0 0 0 0b q b q (3)
The marginal abatement cost is positive and increasing in r, b and q.
2.2. Information
b is known to the agent at the time of entering into the contract. q is obse ved by the
agent after the contract is signed. We assume that it is possible for the principal to
acquire information about  before the contract is offered to the agent. Information
about b could be acquired through studies of the condition of the existing technology
used in the agent country, abatement cost functions, etc. Gathering information about b
is, however, costly for the principal. The principal could also design a contract where the
agent’s observation of q also was available to the principal. This could be the case if, for
instance, the agent had to let the principal monitor the abatement projects. This
monitoring process is assumed to be costly for the principal.
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2.3. Time-line
      0               1           2             3
The principal  The principal The random variable The abatement is
can acquire   offers the agent q   is observed by the observed. The agent
information   a contract. agent. The Principal is paid according to
about b .   The agent can acquire information the contract.
  knows b . about q .
We will restrict the analysis to the case where b  and q  belong to the two-point supports
{b 1, b 2}and {q 1, q 2 }, where b 1< b 2 and q 1 < q 2 .  If b  is b 1, we will refer to the non-
cooperating country as a b 1-type, and refer to non-cooperating country as b 2-type if b  is
b 2. The agent knows at time t=1 whether the non-cooperating country is a b 1-type o  a
b 2- type. We assume that C(r,b 1,q 2) < C(r,b 2,q 1) and that C/r(r,b 1,q 2) < C/r(r,b 2,q 1), which
means that the b 1-type has a lower total and marginal abatement cost than the b 2 -type for
both outcomes of q .  b is hence more important for total and marginal abatement cost
than q .4  We will throughout the paper assume that the principal wants the agent to
implement the climate policy even for bad outcomes of the cost parameters.
We will first consider the design of an abatement contract in the case where the principal
does not acquire costly information about b or seeks to monitor the agent’s observations
of q . Applying the Revelation Principle established in Dasgupta et al. (1979) and
Myerson (1979), we can restrict our attention to contracts for which the agent reports
the private information truthfully. We seek to find the truthful direct mechanism for
which the agent reports the value of b  truth ully at time t=1 and the value of q  tr thfully
                                         
4 This assumption ensures that there is no ambiguity regarding which of the two types’ incentive compatibility
constraints and individual rationality constraints (defined in section 2.4and 2.5) that will be binding in the optimal
contract.
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at time t=2. We assume that if the agent is indifferent between lying and telling the truth,
he tells the truth.
Let b and d be the agent’s announcement of b  and q  respectively.  bÎ{b1, b2} where b1 =
b 1 and b2 = b 2 and d Î{d1, d2} where d1 = q 1 and d2 = q 2.
The agent does not know the outcome of q at time t=1. The principal designs a two-
contract menu. One contract is designed for the b1-type and one is designed for the b2-
type. The agent observes the two contracts and announces that the country is a b1-type
or a b2-type and gets the contracts designed for the type he announces. Both contracts
specify two options for a combination of abatement levels (r) and financial transfers (S).
The abatement levels in each of the contracts are functions of the announcement of q
when observed by the agent at time t=2. The abatement levels specified in the contracts
are hence functions of the announcement of b  at time t=1 and q  at time t=2. The financial
transfers are functions of the abatement levels. We can therefore write the agent’s profit
function, given by (2), as P( ( , ), , ) ( ( , )) ( ( , ), , )r b d S r b d C r b db q b q= - .
2.4. Incentive constraints
We have two incentive constraints for truth-telling about b at time t=1:
IC1i: E P  (r(bi,d(bi, b i , q )),b i , q ) ³ E P  (r(bk,d(bk, b i , q )),b i,q )     i=1,2; k=1,2; k¹i (4)
where
We have four incentive constraints for truth-telling about q  at time t=2;
 IC2ij: P (r(bi,dj),b i,q j) ³ P (r(bi,dh),b i,q j) i=1,2; j=1,2; h=1,2 and j¹h (6)
d(b, , ) = arg max.  (r(b,d), , ) 
d  d ,d1 2
b q b qP
Î
 (5)
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(4) states that it is incentive compatible for the agent to report b  truthfully at time t=1,
given the best response function d(·) at time t=2 as defined by (5). (6) states that the best
response at time t=2, given truthful reporting of b at time t=1, is to report q tru hfully.
Let ri j and Si j be the abatement level and financial transfer specified in the contract given
to the agent if he reports b =b i at time t=1 and d=q j at time t=2, and let Ci j(r) º C(r,b i,q j).
Furthermore, let the financial transfer and abatement pairs {Si1,ri1 } and {Si2, ri2} be the
two options offered to the agent if he announces b =b i at time t=1.
It follows from (2) that the constraints given by (6) for the b 1-type amount to
C11(r11) - C11(r12)£ d 1 £ C12(r11) - C12(r12), where d1 º S11 - S12 (7)
and the constraints given by (6) for the b 2-type amount to
C21(r21) - C21(r22) £ d 2 £ C22(r21) - C22(r22), where d2 º S21 - S22 (8)
(7) and (8) set restrictions on the differences in financial transfer as a function of the
abatement demanded in each of the contracts. A condition for these constraints to be
satisfied is that ri1 ³ i2 since C r q
/ / ( )× > 0 . We will in the following assume that ri1 ³ ri2 in
the two-contract menu offered to the agent.
2.5. The principal’s expected cost and agent’s individual rationality
constraints
The principal's expected cost of the two-contract menu is a function of the abatement
levels and financial transfer specified in the contract and the probability distributions for
b and q . Let v be the principal’s subjective probability that the non-cooperating country’s
abatement cost parameter is b 1. Let p be the agent’s and principal’s common belief about
the probability for q  to turn out to be q 1 at time t=2.
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The principal’s expected cost of reaching the global abatement target is given by
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(9)
The principal’s optimization problem is to minimize (9) subject to the incentive
compatible constraints (4) and (6) and the individual rationality constraints which are
given by
IRi : EP (r(b i,q )) ³ 0  i=1,2 (10)
and
IRij : P (b i,q j) ³ -g     i = 1,2;  j=1,2g ³ 0 (11)
(10) states that the agent’s expected profit of accepting the contract should be higher or
equal to the reservation utility, which is normalized to zero.
(11) states that the profit of both outcomes of q  should be larger or equal to -g , where
g  is the cost of the climate policy implemented before q  is observed. g  can be regarded as
sunk cost. (11) is an ex post participation constraint. The agent will breach the contract if
(11) is not satisfied.
In the following we will consider two different situations. First we will consider the
situation where the agent will have carried out several abatement projects before q is
observed. This means that the sunk cost (g ) is large when the agent observes q .  This
could be the situation if the non-cooperating country has to implement a range of
different kinds of abatement projects to achieve a certain abatement level. The country
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therefore has to implement several different projects before q  is learned. We assume that
g  is so large when q  is observed that the ex post participation constraint, given by (11),
never will be binding in the optimal contract. We refer to this situation as a situation
where the cost of breaching the contract, (which equals g ) , is high. The optimal contract
in this situation is derived in section 3.
In section 4 we will consider the situation where the agent observes q  when only a few
projects have been implemented, that is, g  is low when q is observed. This could be the
situation if the agent is going to implement lots of very similar projects to achieve a
certain target for abatement. The agent will therefore learn the outcome of q after having
implemented only a few of the projects. We assume that g  is so sm ll when q is observed
that the x post participation constraint, given by (11), will be binding in the optimal
contract. We refer to this situation as situation where the cost of breaching the contract,
(which equals g ) , is low.
To discuss the impact of asymmetric information and uncertainty, we first derive the
solution for the case where the principal has complete information about b  at he time
t=1 and observes q  at time t=2.
2.6. Optimal contract under full information about b and observable q at
time t=2
The principal’s optimization problem is to minimize (9) with respect to Sij and rij subject
to (10) and (11). Since the financial transfer is costly for the principal, the individual
rationality constraints given by (10) are binding.
If b  equals b 1 the solution to the cost minimization problem is found by minimizing (9)
for v equal to 1 with respect to r1j and S1j, where the constraints IR1 given by (10) are
binding.
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The solution to the minimization problem is given by
- = =
dD
dr
dC
dr
j
j
j
j
1
1
1 1,2 (12)
[ ] [ ]p S p S p C r p C r( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )11 21 11 11 21 211 1+ - = + - (13)
If b  equals b 2 the solution to the cost minimization problem is found by minimizing (9)
for v equal to 0 with respect to r2j and S2j, where the constraints IR2 given by (10) are
binding.
The solution to the minimization problem is given by
- = =
dD
dr
dC
dr
j
j
j
j
2
2
2 1,2 (14)
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21 1+ - = + - (15)
dD
drj
i  (= - -
dD
d R rj
i( )
)  expresses the cooperating countries’ reduction in marginal
abatement cost as a function of abatement carried out in the non-cooperating country.
-
dD
drj
i  is hence the principal’s marginal benefit of abatement carried out in the non-
cooperating country. We see from (12) and (14) that the contract is designed so that the
principal’s marginal benefit of abatement carried out in the non-cooperating country
equals the non-cooperating country’s marginal abatement cost for all outcomes of the
cost function. The optimal contract is achieved for all combinations of Si1 and Si2 that
satisfy IRi. By choosing Sij equal to Cij(rij) the principal can always ensure that (11) is
satisfied.
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This is first-best solution for the distribution abatement. The abatement is distributed
cost-effectively between the cooperating countries and the non-cooperating country for
all outcomes of the cost function. Furthermore, it follows from (13) and (15) that the
principal extracts all rent.
3. The optimal contract when the cost of breaching the contract
is high
In this section we analyze the principal’s optimal policy when the individual rationality
constraints given by (11) are always satisfied if the constraints given by (10) are satisfied.
We will first derive the optimal contract in the case of asymmetric information about b
but observable q  for both the principal and the agent at time t=2. This will be the case if
the principal takes direct part in the implementation of the abatement projects and gets
access to the same information as the agent at time t=2. Thereafter we derive the optimal
contract in the case where b is known by both parties at time t=1, but the outcome of
q is observed only by the agent. This will be the situation if the principal acquired
information about b at time t=0, but did not observe the outcome of q at t=2. In section
3.3 we derive the optimal contract when b is unknown to the principal when the contract
is signed and q will only be observed by the agent.
3.1. The optimal contract when the agent has private knowledge about
b  b  and qq  is observed by both parties
It follows from the fact that the agent’s abatement cost function is increasing in b ,  that
IR1 given by (10) is satisfied if IC11 and IR2, given by (4) and (10), are satisfied. We can
hence ignore IR1 in the optimization problem. The b 1-type’s marginal abatement cost is
lower than the b 2-type’s marginal abatement cost for both outcomes of q . If IR2 i
satisfied, the agent will get a positive profit if the non-cooperating country is a b  1-type
and the agent announces that it is a b 2-type. The agent has therefore an incentive to
overstate the true cost parameter if the non-cooperating country is a b 1-type. The
18
principal has to ensure that the contract design induces the agent to report b  truthfully if
b  equals b 1. Since financial transfer is costly to the principal, the Individual Rationality
constraint for the b 2-type, (IR2), and the Incentive Compatibility constraint for the b 1-
type, (IC11) are binding in the optimal contract. The principal’s optimal two-contract
menu is found by minimizing (9) with respect to rij and Sij, subject to the binding
constraints IR2 given by (10) and IC11 given by (4). The agent has to announce q
truthfully at time t=2 since the outcome of q  is observed by the principal.
The solution to the problem is characterized by :
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and r11 and r12 given by (12).
It follows from the binding constraints IR2 and IC11 that the financial transfers specified
in the contract give
EP2 0= (18)
and
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We see from (19) that expected profit of accepting the contract is positive for the b 1-
type. It follows from our assumptions about the non-cooperating country’s abatement
cost that the second term on the right hand side of (16) and (17) is positive. The
principal’s marginal benefit of abatement exceeds the marginal abatement cost in the
optimal contract designed for the b 2-typ . Asymmetric information causes too low
abatement and no expected profit for the b 2-type and a positive expected profit and first-
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best abatement level for the b 1-type. The asymmetric information about b forces the
principal to leave an expected profit, often referred to as an informational rent, to the b 1-
type in order to induce the agent to tell the truth about b . The informational rent is
increasing in the abatement demanded from the b 2-type. The reason for this is that the
difference between the marginal abatement cost between the b 1-typ  a d b 2-type is
higher the higher abatement demanded (Cr b
// > 0). The principal faces a trade of between
leaving an expected profit to the b 1-typ  and low abatement demanded from b 2-type. To
reduce the expected profit to the b 1-typ the investor lowers the abatement level
requested from the b 2-type.
3.2. The optimal contract in the case where b is known by both parties at
time t=1, but the outcome of q is observed only by the agent.
We have assumed that the principal can obtain information about b  bef re the agent is
offered the contract. At time t=0, before the principal acquires information about the
non-cooperating country’s expected abatement cost, she knows that there is a probability
v that b equals b 1 and a probability 1-v that b equals b 2. When the principal has observed
b , she designs a contract at time t=1 that minimizes the expected abatement cost given
full information about b . At time t=0 the optimal contract design of this policy is found
by minimizing (9) with respect to rij and Sij, subject to the two individual rationality
constraints given by (10) and the incentive compatibility constraints at time t=2 given by
(7) and (8).
Given that d1 and d2 are chosen so that (7) and (8) are satisfied, the values have no
impact on the expected profit left to the agent. The binding constraints are IR1 and IR2
given by (10). The solution to this problem is abatement levels given by (12) and (14)
and combinations of Si1 and Si2 which satisfy (7), (8), (13) and (15). The two-contract
menu induces the agent to reveal its private information about q truthfully a time t=2.
The agent’s profit will depend on the outcome of q ,  but the principal is able to extract
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the expected rent through the financial transfers specified in the contracts. The fact that q
is not observed by the principal does not distort the contract away from first-best
abatement levels if the agent has no private information when entering into the contract.
3.3. The optimal contract when b is unobserved by the principal and
q will only be observed by the agent.
The principal’s optimal two-contract menu is found by minimizing (9) subject to the
binding constraints IC11 and IR2 and the four constraints given by (6). We see from (4),
that IC11 is a function of d(b,b ,q )  as defined by (5). If IC21, given by (6) is satisfied,
IC11 can be written as
IC11: E P  (r(b1,q ),b 1,q ) ³ E P  (r(b2,d(b2, b 1,q )),b 1,q ) (20)
where d( , , )b2 1b q is given by (5).
The agent has two possible announcements for d, either d1 or d2. It follows from our cost
function assumptions that given that (8) is satisfied and q  is q 1, it is always more
profitable to take the contract {S21, r21} than {S22, r22 }, given that the agent is b 1- ype.
This means that d(b2, b 1,q 1,) =d1. However, if q = q 2, the profit for the b 1-type of lying
about q  at time t=2 is higher than telling the truth given that the agent lied about b at
time t=1. Inserting from the agent’s profit function we see that d(b2, b 1,q 2,) =d1 satisfies
(5) if
d 2 2
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1
2
2
1
2
2> -C r C r( ) ( ) (21)
Inserting from the lower bound of d 2 given by (8), we see that (21) is satisfied for all d 2 if
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(22) is satisfied since we have assumed that C/r(r,b 1,q 2) < C/r(r,b 2,q 1) and r21 ³ r22 in the
optimal contract. This implies that d(b2, b 1,q 2) =d1.
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The solution to the principal’s optimization problem is found by minimizing (9) w th
respect to rij and Sij subject to the binding constraints. The informational rent left to the
b 1-type is increasing in d 2. d 2 is hence in the optimal contract set equal to the lower
bound of (8). The binding constraints in the optimal contract are therefore IR2, IC11
where d(b2, b 1,q ) = d1 and IC221.
The solution to the optimal contract design problem is characterized by:
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and r11 and r12 given by (12)
From the binding constraints IR2, IC11 and IC221 it follows that the financial transfers
specified in the contract give
EP2 0=  (25)
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We see from (23) and (24) that r21 and r22 are lower than the first-best abatement levels
given by (14). The agent will get a positive rent if the non-cooperating country is a b 1-
type. It follows from the assumptions about the abatement cost function that both terms
in the square-bracket in (23) are positive. When comparing the optimal contract in
section 3.1, where q  is observed by the principal, with the optimal contract above we see
that r21 and r22, given by (23) and (24), differ from the optimal abatement given by (16)
and (17). In the contract above, the b 1- ype, if the agent announced that it was a b 2-type
at time t=1, will find it optimal to choose the r21 abatement level for both outcomes of
22
q at time t=2. An increase in r21 will hence increase the expected profit of lying at time
t=1 more in the contract designed above than in the contract designed in section 3.1. The
optimal contract designed when q  is u observed by the principal will therefore specify a
lower abatement level r21 than the contract designed when the principal observes q at
time t=2.
The r22 abatement level has no direct effect on the informational rent in the contract
above since the b 1-type will never find it optimal to choose the r22 abat ment level at time
t=2, given that the agent lied about b  t time t=1. However, an increase in r22 will
increase the financial transfer S21 b cause of IR2 and IC12. The level of r22 thus has an
indirect impact on the informational rent. Since S21 is i reasing in r22, the expected rent
of taking the contract designed for the b 2-type increases when r22 i creases. However, an
increase in r22 has less impact on the informational rent given to the b 1-type w en q is
unobserved by the principal, than when q  is observed by the principal. The contract
designed when q  is unobserved by the principal will therefore specify a higher r22 than t
contract designed when the principal observes q at tim  t=2.
We have restricted the analysis to a “two-q -outcomes” model. However, if q was
continuously distributed, it would always be optimal for the b 1-type to announce a lower
value of q than the true value, given that the agent had lied about b  at time t=1.
The possibility for understating q at t=2 increases the expected profit of lying about b at
t=1. In order to reduce the cost of inducing truth-telling about b , the principal will induce
the low values of abatement levels specified for the b 2-type to deviate less from the first-
best level than the high values of abatement levels compared to the situation where q is
observable.
As we showed in section 3.2, the fact that the outcome of q  was observed only by the
agent at time t=2, did not distort the contract away from first-best if b  was obs rved by
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both parties at time t=1. However, the agent's private information after the contract is
signed is costly to the principal in combination with private information before the
contract is signed, even though the agent is risk neutral and the cost of breaching the
contract is high.
We see from the optimal two-contract menu derived in this section that it is always
profitable for the principal to design a contract where the b 1-type can choose the
abatement level after the value of q  has been observed. That is, r11 differs from r12 in the
optimal contract. It is also profitable to offer a flexible contract to the b 2- ype unless for
the special case where the difference in the marginal abatement cost in the optimal
contract for the two different outcomes of q  is exactly offset by the difference in the
marginal impact on the informational rent for r21 = r22.
It also follows from our model that it is always beneficial for the principal to design a
two-contract menu where the agent has to choose among the two contracts at time t=1
instead of a single contract offered at time t=1 where b  and q  are announced
simultaneously at time t=2. By forcing the agent to announce b  at time t=1, and q  at time
t=2, the principal reduces the informational rent necessary to induce the b 1- ype to reveal
b  and q truthfully. A single contract offered at time t=1 where the agent does not have to
announce b before q is observed, would specify four different combinations of abatement
levels and financial transfers {S,r}.5  One combination designed for each of the four
outcomes of {b ,q } the agent announces at time t=2. It follows from the fact that C11 <
C12, that the combination of {S12,r12} specified in the two-contract menu characterized by
(12), (23)- (26) does not ensure truthtelling for the b 1-type when q equals q 2, and the
agent announces the outcomes of {b ,q } at time t=2. A contract where the agent
announces b and q simultaneously at time t=2 will leave the agent with a higher expected
profit, than when the agent had to announce b before q was known.
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The uncertainty about q  at time t=1, compared to a situation where q  was p ivate
knowledge to the agent at time t=1, reduces the principal's cost for two reasons. First,
the fact that q is uncertain for the agent at time t=1 implies that the principal can design a
two-contract menu where the agent has to announce b before q is known and hence
reduces the informational rent left to the b 1- ype. Second, if the agent had known the
true cost at time t=1, he would never accept the contract if the profit was less than the
reservation utility. Hence, the principal would have to ensure that the profit for the
{b 2,q 2} outcome had to be at least as large as the agent's reservation utility, since we
have assumed that the principal find it beneficial to contract with the agent for all
outcomes of {b ,q} . This constraint would increase the expected rent given to the agent.
(The optimal contract in the case where there are restrictions on the profit for the high
cost agent is analyzed in section 4).
The first-best contract would be achieved if both b and q were unknown to the agent
when the contract was signed at time t=1. The binding individual rationality constraint in
that case would require that the expected profit is non-negative, that is
v E v E× + - × ³P P1 21 0( ) , while the constraint IR2 given by (10) did not have to be
satisfied.6  The incentive compatibility constraint would not represent a cost to the
principal when the agent maximizes expected profit and would never find it beneficial to
breach the contract. If the agent has no private information when entering into the
contract, the optimal contract would induce the agent to report its private information
obtained after the contract is signed truthfully and leave the agent with zero expected
rent.
3.4. The value of acquiring information
If b is known to the principal at time t=1, the fact that q is privately observed by the
agent at time t=2 does not distort the contract away from first-best. The principal does
                                                                                                                 
5 In order to ensure that the contract is incentive compatible, r must be non-decreasing in C, that is r11 ³ r12 ³ r21 ³
r22.
6 We assume that g  is so large that (11) is satisfied in the contract.
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not gain anything from designing a contract where she will observe q if b is known to the
principal at time t=1.
If the principal did not acquire information about b , it is valuable for the principal to
observe q because the agent's private observation of q increases the informational rent
for the b1-type. The cost of monitoring q will determine whether it is optimal for the
principal to design a contract where q is observed at time t=2.
The principal's abatement cost will always be higher when b is private information to the
agent, than when b is common knowledge. The expected gain of acquiring information
about b at time t=0 is positive if the expected abatement cost following from the first-
best contract given by (12)-(15), plus the cost of acquiring information, is less than the
expected abatement cost following from the optimal contract when b is private
knowledge to the agent, characterized by (12) and (23) - (26).
4. The optimal contract when the cost of breaching the contract
is low
We know from the optimal two-contract menus derived in section 3 that EP 2 was equal
to 0. If q  was not observed by the principal, the incentive compatibility constraints for
truth-telling at time t=2, given by (8), implied that P 22 < 0. In this section we will analyze
the optimal contract in a situation where the ex post participation constraint given by
(11), will be binding. This means that the principal has to ensure that, when the agent
observes the complete cost of abatement, the profit of fulfilling the contract is as least as
large as the cost of the abatement projects already implemented (g ). W  will assume that
g  is small enough to ensure that IR1 and IR2 are satisfied if IR22, IC11, IC21 and IC22 are
satisfied.
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4.1. The optimal contract when the agent has private information about bb
and qq  is observed by both parties
If q will be observed by the principal, the agent knows at time t=1 that he has no
possibility of lying about q  a  time t=2. The solution to the optimal contract design in this
case is found by minimizing (9) with respect to rij and Sij subject to the binding
constraints IR22, IR2, and IC11 given by (10), (11) and (4). Since q will be observed by
the principal, we can ignore the incentive compatibility constraints (IC2ij), give  by (6).
The solution to the optimal contract design is identical to the contract derived in section
3.1, (r11 and r12 are given by (12) and r21, r22, E P 1 and EP 2 are given by (16)- (19).
When q is observed by the principal the fact that the agent will breach the contract if P 22
<-g  is not costly for the principal.
4.2. The optimal contract in the case where b is known by both parties at
time t=1, but the outcome of q is observed only by the agent.
At time t=0, the principal knows that there is a probability v that she will observe that the
non-cooperating country is b 1-type and a probability (1-v) that it is a b 2- ype if she
acquires information about b . When the principal has observed b , she designs a contract
at time t=1 that minimizes the cooperating countries' expected abatement cost given full
information about b . At t=0 the optimal contract design of this policy is found by
minimizing (9) with respect to rij and Sij subject to the two binding individual rationality
constraints IR12 and IR22 given by (11), and IC211 and IC221 given by (6). IC211 and IC221
are binding in the optimal contract because E P 1 is increasing in d 1 and E P 2 is increasing
in d 2. d 1 and d 2 are therefore set equal to the lower bound of (7) a (8), respectively.
We assume that g  is small enough to ensure that IR1 and IR2, given by (10), are satisfied
if IR12, IR22, IC211 and IC221 are satisfied.
The optimal contract design is characterized by:
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and r11 and r21 given by (12) and (14).
It follows from the binding constraints IR12, IR22, IC211 and IC221 that the financial
transfers specified in the contract give
[ ]E p C r C rP2 22 22 12 22= - -( ) ( ) g (29)
[ ]E p C r C rP1 21 21 11 21= - -( ) ( ) g (30)
We get the first-best solution for r11 and r21, but r12 and r22 are lower than first-best. The
agent's private observation of q  forces the principal to trade off expected informational
rent to both types of agents against efficiency losses. Since the principal does not observe
q  she is forced to leave a non-negative informational rent to both types of agents in order
to induce the agent to tell the truth about q  at t=2.The informational rent is increasing in
the abatement demanded for the q 2 -outcome of q .  The reason for this is that the
difference in marginal abatement cost between q 2 and q 1 is higher the higher abatement
demanded (Cr q
/ / > 0 for both types of agents).
4.3. Optimal contract when b is unobserved by the principal and q will
only be observed by the agent.
The optimal solution to the problem is found by minimizing (9) with respect to rij and Sij
subject to the binding constraints IR22, IC11 and IC221 given by respectively (11), (4) and
(6), and d(b2, b 1,q ) given by (5) equals d1.
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The solution to the problem is characterized by:
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and r11 and r12 given by (12) and r21 given by (23).
It follows from the binding constraints IR2, IC11 and IC221 that the financial transfers
specified in the contract give
E p C r C rP2 2
2
2
2
1
2
2
2= - -( ( ) ( )) g (32)
E C r C r C r C r
p C r C r
P1 2
2
2
2
1
2
2
2
1
2
1
2
2
1
1
2
2
1
1
2
1
1
1
2
= - + -
+ - -
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ( ) ( )) g (33)
We have assumed that g  is small enough to ensure that IR1 and IR2 are satisfied if IR22,
IC11, IC21 and IC22 are satisfied. This means that the agent’s expected rent of accepting
the contract is non-negative for both outcomes of b . If we compare (31) with (24), we
find that r22 is lower when the cost of breaching the contract is low than in the case
where the cost of breaching the contract is high. There are two reasons for this. First,
since the ex post individual rationality constraint (11) is binding when the cost of
breaching the contract is low, a lower r22 will educe the expected rent to the b 2-type due
the incentive compatibility constraint at time t=2 (IC221). Second, since the expected
profit for the b 2 -type is non-negative and increasing in r22, the informational rent left to
the b 1-type is also increasing in r22. By reducing r22, when the cost of breaching the
contract is low, the principal reduces the payment needed to induce truth-telling at time
t=1, more than in the situation where the cost of breaching the contract was high.
As we discussed in section 3.3, it is always profitable for the principal to design a
contract where the agent has to announce the outcome of b  at time t=1, instead of
designing a contract where the agent announces b  and q simultaneously at time t=2 if
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both b and q are unobservable for the principal. When the agent does not have to
announce b  before q is observed, the expected profit given to the b 1-type in order to
induce truthtelling is higher, than when the agent announced b before q was known. This
implies that the principal can take advantages of the fact that q  is unknown to the agent
at the time of entering into the contract. The principal reduces the cooperating countries'
abatement cost by designing a contract where the agent has to announce b  at time t=1
and q at time t=2.
If the cost of breaching the contract is low it is beneficial for the principal that the agent
knows the value of b before q is observed. If the agent did not observe the outcome of
b before time t=2, the agent would be offered a contract at time t=1 that specified four
different combinations of abatement levels and financial transfers {S,r}.7  One
combination designed for each of the four outcomes of {b ,q} the agent announces at
time t=2. The expected profit given to the agent would then be higher than in the
contract derived in section 4.3 to induce truth-telling. This conclusion is opposed to the
conclusion in section 3.3 where we concluded that if both b and q were uncertain to the
agent at the time of signing the contract, the principal could design a first-best contract
that was incentive compatible. In section 3.3 the agent's private knowledge of b when the
contract was signed implied that the principal had to ensure that EP 2 ³ 0. However, if
both b and q were unknown to the agent when the contract was signed the principal had
only to ensure that v E v E× + - × ³P P1 21 0( ) . The latter binding individual rationality
constraint implies that it is not costly for the principal to induce truthtelling. However,
when the cost of breaching the contract is low, the binding individual rationality
constraint is not affected by the fact that b  is known or not when the contract is signed.
The binding individual rationality constraint is in both situations given by (11), that is,
P 22 ³ -g  . It is beneficial for the principal that the agent knows b  before q i  observed
because that reduces the b 1- ype's truth-inducing informational rent. The abatement
levels specified in the optimal contract if both b  and q are uncertain when the contract is
signed, and will be announced simultaneously at time t=2, are identical to the abatement
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levels specified if both b  and q  are private knowledge to the agent when the contract is
signed. If g  had been equal to zero, the financial transfer would also be identical.
4.4. The value of acquiring information
The principal's abatement cost will always be higher when b is private information to the
agent, than when b is common knowledge. Information about b implies that the principal
does not have to give the agent an informational rent to induce truth-telling at time t=1.
Comparing the optimal contract in section 3.2 with 4.2 we see that if the principal has to
ensure that the agent does not breach the contract for bad outcomes of q , observing b i
not sufficient to achieve the first-best contract. It could therefore be beneficial for the
principal to both acquire information about b bef re the agent was offered the contract
and to design a contract where the principal monitored the outcome of q at time t=2.
The principal’s value of observing q when b is private knowledge to the agent is higher
when the agent’s cost of breaching the contract is low than when the cost of breaching
the contract is high. When the cost of breaching the contract is high, observing q would
remove the b1-type’s possibility of overstating q at time t=2. This would, as discussed in
section 3.3, imply that the informational rent in order to induce truth-telling at time t=1
would be decreased. However, if the cost of breaching the contract is low, observing q
means that the principal does not have to give the b2-typ an informational rent in order
to induce truth-telling at time t=1. Furthermore, the informational rent left to the b1-type
can be reduced both because the expected profit left to the b2-type would be zero when
q is observable and because observing q would remove the b1-type’s possibility of
overstating q at time t=2.
                                                                                                                 
7 In  order to ensure that the contract is incentive compatible, r must be increasing in C, that is r11 ³ r12 ³ r21 ³ r22
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5. Concluding remarks
In this paper we have considered a situation where a principal, representing countries
cooperating to reduce global CO2 emissions, offers an agent that represents a non-
cooperating country, an abatement contract. We have assumed that some relevant
information about the non-cooperating country’s abatement cost function is private
knowledge to the agent at the time when the contract is offered. However, the abatement
cost is not completely known by the agent at that time. The agent will privately observe
the complete abatement cost when various abatement projects have been implemented.
Before designing the contract, the principal decides how much costly information she
should try to obtain. The principal has two options for what time she could acquire
information. Information about the non-cooperating country’s expected abatement cost
can be obtained before the contract is offered, or the principal can design a contract that
will give her access to the same information as the agent obtains when implementing the
various abatement projects. The latter type of information can be acquired if the principal
monitored the implementation of the projects.
We have analyzed the gain for the principal of getting access to the same information as
the agent. In the paper we have assumed that the principal cannot force the agent to
fulfill the contract. Hence, if the agent, after observing all relevant information, realizes
that it is less costly to quit the contract and get no payment than to fulfill the contract
and get the payment specified in the contract, the agent will quit. In the paper we have
considered two different situations regarding the agent’s cost of breaching the contract.
If the agent learns the complete abatement cost at an early stage, that is, when only a few
abatement projects have been implemented, the sunk cost of the agent’s investment in
abatement projects is low. We have refer to that situation as a situation where the agent’s
cost of  breaching the contract is low. We assume that the cost of breaching the contract
is so low that the principal has to take into account that she has to prevent the agent
from breaching the contract, when she designs the optimal contract. If a lot of projects
have been implemented before the complete abatement cost is learned, the cost of
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breaching the contract and hence get no payment could be very high. That situation is
referred to as a situation where the agent agent’s cost of breaching the contract is high.
We assume that the agent’s cost of breaching the contract, in that situation,  is so high
that the principal does not have to take into account that she has to prevent the agent
from breaching the contract, when she designs the contract.
We have showed that private information at the time of entering into a contract is
beneficial for the agent both when the cost of breaching the contract is low and when it is
high. The optimal abatement contract in case of asymmetric information will leave the
agent with a positive profit. Furthermore, the contract will not ensure cost-effective
distribution of abatement between the non-cooperating country and the cooperating
countries. Acquiring information before the contract is offered has therefore a positive
value for the principal. Whether it is optimal to acquire information depends on the cost
of obtaining information.
The principal's cost of the contract will be reduced if the agent announces its private
information at the different points of time when the information is observed compared to
a simultaneous announcement after both types of information have been observed.
If the agent’s cost of breaching the contract is high, we find that the principal can achieve
the first best contract if she gets access to the same information as the agent has before
the contract is offered. The distribution of abatement between the cooperating countries
and the non-cooperating country is in that case cost-effective and the principal extracts
all rent. In that situation there will be no additional benefit for the principal to monitor
the implementation of the abatement projects. However, if the agent has some private
information about the cost function before the contract is signed, private information
obtained after the contract is signed will increase the agent’s expected profit. Monitoring
the implementation of the abatement projects will hence in that situation increase the
principal’s expected benefit of the contract (exclusive the cost of monitoring).
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The principal’s access to the same information as the agent has before the contract is
signed will not be sufficient to ensure the first best contract if the agent’s cost of
breaching the contract is low. Private information after the contract is signed implies that
the optimal contract will leave the agent with a positive expected profit. It could
therefore be beneficial for the principal to monitor the implementation of the abatement
projects even if she had the same information as the agent when the contract was signed.
The principal’s value of monitoring the implementation of the various abatement projects
is always higher when the agent’s cost of breaching the contract is low than when it is
high.
We have assumed that the agent is risk neutral. Assuming risk neutrality simplifies the
presentation of the characteristics of the optimal contracts and emphasizes the trade-off
between informational rent and efficiency losses in the different situations discussed in
the paper. If the agent is risk averse, the uncertainty about the abatement cost implies
that the principal has to give the agent a risk premium. This would reduce the principal’s
benefit of the contract. Moreover, the optimal contract would trade off both
informational rent and risk premium against efficiency losses.8
A risk neutral agent enables us to illustrate the point that even though the agent is risk
neutral and the cost of breaching the contract is high, access to private information after
the contract is signed i  combination with private cost observation at the time of
contracting, reduces the principal’s expected benefit of the contract. The agent’s access
to private information after the contract is signed forces the principal to increase the
agent’s expected profit of the contract in order to induce him to reveal truthfully his
private information held at the time of entering into the contract.
                                         
8  Salanie (1990) shows that the agent’s risk aversion also may play a critical role in the shape of optimal contracts.
He shows that pooling will occur for large values of the agent’s absolute risk aversion when the agent learns his
private information after the contract is signed.
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It can be argued that a developing country with very low income could be risk neutral for
positive incomes but will not accept an abatement contract if there is a probability that it
will get a negative profit. This is sometimes referred to as if the country has "infinite risk
aversion below zero." That means the non-cooperating country will never accept a
contract if not all outcomes of the abatement contract gave a non negative profit. In that
case we would get the same optimal abatement contracts as if the agent’s cost of
breaching the contract was zero.
In the paper we have assumed that it is not possible for the principal to enforce the agent
to fulfill the contract if the agent finds it more beneficial to breach the contract. The only
instrument for inducing the agent to fulfill the target is the monetary transfer specified in
the contract. However, this assumption may not be valid for all potential non-
cooperating countries. The cooperating countries could, for example, prevent the non-
cooperating country from breaching the contract through threats of trade sanctions or
retention of loans. (The non-cooperating country could also fulfill the obligations
specified in the contract, even though it would give a negative profit, if it wants to keep a
good reputation in case of other climate contracts in the future). Unless the cost of
monitoring is zero, the cooperating countries prefer to enter into a contract with a
country that will never find it beneficial to breach the contract. It can therefore be
beneficial for the cooperating countries to enter into a climate contract with a country
they can “enforce” to not breach the contract.
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